____________________________________________ 4 IICC Perspectives Arab-initiated violence and attacks. So it was in the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War, the first intifada (we ignited the second intifada) and all the terrorist attacks initiated by the Palestinian Terrorist Organizations, including the October 7 disaster. Rockets launched from Gaza to Israel (Photo - Haaretz newspaper) Second, except perhaps in tactical areas (interpreting intelligence "secrets") and indicating the potential capabilities of our enemies, it has been conclusively proven that we should not expect the intelligence community to provide the decision makers at the political-military level, with early warnings, related to the intentions of our enemies on a strategic level, as it cannot solve "mysteries". We have never been caught more unaware than on that Black Saturday which turned the celebrations of Simchat Torah into a national disaster. So what? Retrospectively, throughout the country's history, it never benefited from a strategic intelligence Early Warning before violent Arab initiatives. That was the case on the eve of Operation Rotem (February 1960, the surprising, unannounced entry of the Egyptian army into the Sinai Peninsula); that was also the case on the eve of the Six Day War (the rapid return of the Egyptian army from Yemen and its entry into the Sinai Peninsula); the case on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the first intifada, and the October 7, 2023, disaster. Consciously abandoning expectations of a strategic early warning will also save the enormous amounts of money invested in the failed attempts to produce it.
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