____________________________________________ 12 IICC Perspectives 8. The international community was perceived as a constraining element which would not allow any confrontation in the Middle East. This was so against the background of the “detente” and the atmosphere of reconciliation which developed between Washington and Moscow, including the summit meetings between the two presidents in the period prior to the war. The expulsion of the Soviet advisers from Egypt and the bad relations between Cairo and Moscow were mistakenly interpreted as harming Egypt’s ability to initiate a confrontation, which the Soviet Union was against in any case. On the other side, too much importance was attached to the “insurance policy” on tensibly granted by the United States to its “client” in the region, a policy which would further strengthen the Israeli deterrent and remove any thought among the Arabs of initiating a violent confrontation. 9. Given the firm opinion that a war was not in the offing, writers in general viewed an Israeli-Arab political settlement as the most likely path. Possibly the buds of a “peace drive” in the Arab world which received a little too much prominence, also contributed to this assessment. 10. At the same time, it was noted that in view of the political-military balance of power, Israel need not hurry to move towards any settlement which would require it to be the “giving side”. At the time, the theory was that it was up to the Arabs to take the first step, recognizing Israel’s special security needs, and taking them into consideration. One can also identify the approach according to which if the Egyptians, the dominant factor in the Arab world, do not agree to direct negotiations and an interim settlement, it is preferable for Israel to preserve the “Status-quo”, to sit idle, and leave the situation be, since “our situation has never been better”. Brezhnev- USSR Chairman (Wikipedia) Leonid Richard Nixson - US President (Wikipedia)
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