____________________________________________ 6 IICC Perspectives Questions to be asked The failures of the military intelligence system led the Agranat Commission2 to establish the Center at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create pluralism in intelligence thinking and assessment; for various reasons, over the years the weakening of the Center caused the erosion of the model. However, in 2006 the Winograd Commission3 praised the Center’s performance, despite its difficulties, for its reliable strategicpolitical assessments on the northern front in the face of the Hezbollah challenge, and recommended expanding and strengthening it. Foreign Minister Livni and Director General Abramovich, both energetic and committed, implemented the recommendations. Even years later, beyond their tenure, healthy attentiveness in the governing and intelligence systems to the Center’s analyses remained, including in the Cabinet. However, over time, the Center’s influence waned because of the weakening of the foreign ministry, budget cuts, depletion of human resources, and stripping the Center of key areas of responsibility and transferring them to other ministries. Several questions demand attention and there lessons still to be learned: • Why did an intelligence organization, denied access to some of the “intimate” intelligence materials,4 still have a clear view of the real situation, while parts of the intelligence community, favored with highly classified materials, failed to do so? Does reliance on classified materials and the expectation that they can provide warnings cause blindness and a failure to grasp the open strategic picture? • Why were all the intelligence assessments of all the agencies on the Palestinian issue not integrated so their validity could be evaluated, especially in a situation of dramatic regional changes? That could be expected, given the conclusions of the Agranat and Winograd Commission, which in practice evaporated. Under the law defining its roles, the National Security Council (NSC) was supposed to do just that but failed to fulfill its duty. According to the Winograd Commission recommendations, responsibility also lay with the foreign minister, who presumably also did not act. Integrating intelligence assessments among the various agencies is critical, also given the dominance of Military Intelligence (as the so-called “national assessor,” a title which should be discarded) and its weight within the intelligence system. 2 Investigated the IDF failure in the Yom Kippur War in 1973. 3 Investigated the Second Lebanon War in 2006. 4 For example, "Jericho Wall", the Hamas code name for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre.
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