____________________________________________ 5 IICC Perspectives In 2009, the Center warned that the concept of “Jordan is Palestine” was dangerous for Israel. After proper review by the political echelon, including consultations with actors outside the foreign ministry, the idea was dropped. In 2010, in response to the dramatic but undeclared shift in Israeli policy toward the PA (which began in 2009), aimed at weakening and marginalizing it in favor of Hamas, the Center assessed that without political progress with the Palestinians, they would not accept the status quo’s being made permanent. It warned that there would be a new uprising, an undefined third intifada, which would become the fifth Palestinian rebellion. Horrifically, this scenario was realized years later. The assessment was based on the meticulous monitoring of mostly open-source intelligence and the deep historical understanding of the adversary and the conflict. In February 2010, the Center was the only intelligence body to argue that the United States was reconsidering its efforts to accelerate the peace process with the Palestinians, following its failure in summer and fall of 2009. The assessment, although based on solid information, was rejected by the political echelon. At the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the ousting of Egyptian President Mubarak, the Center correctly predicted that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would survive the uprising against him, at least in the short-to-medium term. However, unlike other intelligence and political bodies, the Center argued that "better the devil Israel knew "in Syria, i.e., Assad, was not "better than the devil it didn’t," i.e., an unknown alternative, and was not a guarantee of stability. It considered the theory that “jihad is at the gates” an exaggeration. The alarmist view missed the possibility that Assad’s removal years earlier could have dealt a major blow to the “resistance axis.” The Center’s warned of erosion of support for Israel within the American Democratic Party, especially among younger generations, and warned against abandoning bipartisan engagement in favor of increased reliance on the Republicans. The Center believed that opposing Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran was a mistake, and instead advocated for improving the deal. It also viewed the United States withdrawal from the nuclear deal, encouraged (or even pushed) by Israel, as a strategic error. In hindsight, the move only brought Iran closer to achieving military nuclear capabilities.
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