____________________________________________ 1 IICC Perspectives The Center for Policy Research (CPR – "Mahmad") at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the October 7, 2023 Nimrod Barkan and Benny Dagan* The Center intelligence early warning, towards the October 7th attack Even before 2023, the Center for Policy Research at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Center) had already warned that Hamas had not been deterred and that its leader was motivated by ideological intransigence and a deep commitment to the vision of Israel’s destruction. In the Center’s assessment, Israel’s policy of “differentiation” (subject to the logic of weakening the Palestinian Authority) regarding the Palestinian issue was eroding dangerously and could potentially lead to military-terrorist escalation not only in Judea and Samaria but also in the Gaza Strip, following significant changes in Hamas’ considerations. The Center recognized that Israel was not a “static player,” and with the ongoing assessment that weakening the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the absence of a political process would lead to another Palestinian uprising, validated the demand, in late 2022 and during 2023, to change Israel’s priorities, despite the achievements of the Abraham Accords. In effect, it was a strategic warning in respect to the Gaza Strip, based on a solid assessment of the accelerating general destabilization of the existing order in the Palestinian arena, and 2023 could become a year of violent confrontation, including in Gaza. The warning, which appeared in a series of widely circulated intelligence publications, was ignored by the political echelons both within the foreign ministry and beyond. In our opinion, the dominance of other intelligence bodies, especially Military Intelligence, also deflected attention from it, creating yet another layer of the October 7 intelligence and political failure. Nimrod Barkan, a retired Israeli ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (source: Channel 99). Benny Dagan, are tiered Israeli Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affair (source: Wikipedia).
____________________________________________ 2 IICC Perspectives The Center’s perspective on the Palestinian issue In the period leading up to terrorist attack and massacre which Hamas called Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the Center believed that internal and external triggers, both longstanding and new, were affecting the Hamas leadership in Gaza more than in the past, and they could lead it to respond from within the Gaza Strip itself, changing its previous strategy of maintaining an apparent but specious relative quiet in Gaza which allowed for rearmament and force-building. For Hamas, triggers for shattering the calm in Gaza included Israeli military responses in Gaza, including Israel’s targeting senior terrorist operatives in the West Bank in response to Hamas’ responsibility for escalation in the territories; the policy of the new Israeli government as perceived by Hamas, particularly in Jerusalem and especially on the Temple Mount; Israel’s continued failure to release Palestinian prisoners; and criticism from the West Bank that Hamas wanted quiet and to preserve its assets in the Gaza Strip. Even before 2023, but throughout the year, in its regular and special assessments the Center consistently warned of the accelerating destabilization of the existing order in the Palestinian arena, the weakening of the PA, the strengthening of Hamas and its development of additional operational arenas. It emphasized the need to elevate the place of the Palestinian issue on the national agenda because of its increasing volatility. The Center fundamentally rejected the notion that Hamas under Yahya al-Sinwar was “deterred.” It analyzed the logic of his policies, especially since his takeover of Hamas in 2017, with a practical, realistic understanding of his ideological rigidity and as a nonpragmatic leader, of his strategic commitment to the vision of Israel’s destruction and how to put it into practice. The Center’s assessment that IDF operations in recent years had failed to effectively deter Hamas was consistent and well-substantiated. In May 2021, following Operation Guardian of the Walls, it determined that Hamas had concluded the round of fighting with a genuine sense of having made important achievements. The bottom line was The Center for Political Research (CPR) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warned, even before 2023, that Hamas is not deterred, and that its leader is guided by ideological rigidity and a deep commitment to the vision of eliminating Israel/ (source: Google Gemini)
____________________________________________ 3 IICC Perspectives that Hamas had not been deterred, not by this operation or by any other, contrary to the assessments of other intelligence bodies and senior military and political officials who boasted of successful deterrence. The Center’s warnings ahead of October 7th The Center’s warnings in 2022–2023 were conveyed to all relevant intelligence and political bodies through a series of publications given relatively low security classification to ensure maximum accessibility. The warnings were based primarily on OSINT (open-source information), a deep understanding of the situation and extensive professional experience. During 2023, the Center noted that the potential for escalation from Hamas was increasing from the Gaza Strip. It was caused by what Hamas felt was the growing connection between escalation in the West Bank and its repercussions in Gaza; Israel’s responses, policies and actions, which Hamas attributed to the new Israeli government in Jerusalem, the Temple Mount and elsewhere. Starting in January 2023, the Center papers raised the possibility that Hamas saw 2023 as a year of confrontation with Israel, partly due to what it perceived as provocative Israeli initiatives, such as changes in the status quo in Jerusalem and on the Temple Mount. In December 2022 al-Sinwar called his vision for a "major move" against Israel "a roaring flood." In an update document from February 2023, the Center called the progressive destabilization of the PA a “gray rhinoceros,” meaning it was a high-risk situation with an expected negative outcome, but it would be difficult to predict when all the factors enabling it would align and the charge would begin. In its core 2023 deterrence assessment (allegedly achieved via Operations Guardian of the Walls and Breaking Dawn), the Center concluded in March 2023 that Hamas preserved calm in Gaza exclusively out of self-interest, not deterrence. It further concluded that under certain circumstances, e.g., escalation in the West Bank, Hamas might also escalate the situation from Gaza. (source: Google Gemini)
____________________________________________ 4 IICC Perspectives On August 27, 2023, the Center reported remarks by Saleh al-'Arouri, at the time deputy head of the Hamas’ political bureau and head of its West Bank leadership, who had told Lebanon’s al-Mayadeen TV about “ongoing talks regarding a full-scale war with all members of the resistance axis.”1 In presenting its annual intelligence assessment in September 2023, the Center determined that Israel was entering the year in a more challenging position in the Palestinian arena: Hamas’ policy of “quiet in exchange for economic benefits in Gaza” was expected to erode, particularly in the event of West Bank escalation, the targeting of senior operatives, changes to the status quo in Jerusalem and lack of progress on the prisoner issue. On September 19, 2023, the Center warned of the intensification of “disturbances” along the Gaza border and said that Hamas was signaling dissatisfaction with Israel’s declaration of changing the “equation” following Operation Guardian of the Walls, and with Israel’s threat to eliminate Hamas leaders in Gaza over the group’s involvement in terrorism from the West Bank. The Center’s assessments in historical perspective Thus, not all intelligence agencies completely failed in their evaluation of the situation in the Palestinian arena and Hamas’ conduct. Moreover, the Center has a proven history of sober analyses of situations at critical historical junctures. That translated into presenting balanced and reliable intelligence assessments in the strategic-political sphere, including on the Palestinian issue, to political leaderships from across the spectrum, even if there was not always agreement with its conclusions. For example, in 2006, the Center highlighted the critical issue of Hezbollah’s rearmament following the Second Lebanon War and the need to foil it. That complemented a broader strategic assessment, unique at the time, that the war had fundamentally changed the situation with Hezbollah on the northern border, despite widespread demoralization in Israel and justified criticism of the IDF’s performance. In 2008, the Center rejected the political assessment that a comprehensive agreement with the Palestinians could be achieved and instead recommended pursuing partial steps. 1 Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and the Houthis in Yemen, whose objective is to destroy and eliminate the State of Israel. Logo of the Center for Political Research at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
____________________________________________ 5 IICC Perspectives In 2009, the Center warned that the concept of “Jordan is Palestine” was dangerous for Israel. After proper review by the political echelon, including consultations with actors outside the foreign ministry, the idea was dropped. In 2010, in response to the dramatic but undeclared shift in Israeli policy toward the PA (which began in 2009), aimed at weakening and marginalizing it in favor of Hamas, the Center assessed that without political progress with the Palestinians, they would not accept the status quo’s being made permanent. It warned that there would be a new uprising, an undefined third intifada, which would become the fifth Palestinian rebellion. Horrifically, this scenario was realized years later. The assessment was based on the meticulous monitoring of mostly open-source intelligence and the deep historical understanding of the adversary and the conflict. In February 2010, the Center was the only intelligence body to argue that the United States was reconsidering its efforts to accelerate the peace process with the Palestinians, following its failure in summer and fall of 2009. The assessment, although based on solid information, was rejected by the political echelon. At the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the ousting of Egyptian President Mubarak, the Center correctly predicted that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would survive the uprising against him, at least in the short-to-medium term. However, unlike other intelligence and political bodies, the Center argued that "better the devil Israel knew "in Syria, i.e., Assad, was not "better than the devil it didn’t," i.e., an unknown alternative, and was not a guarantee of stability. It considered the theory that “jihad is at the gates” an exaggeration. The alarmist view missed the possibility that Assad’s removal years earlier could have dealt a major blow to the “resistance axis.” The Center’s warned of erosion of support for Israel within the American Democratic Party, especially among younger generations, and warned against abandoning bipartisan engagement in favor of increased reliance on the Republicans. The Center believed that opposing Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran was a mistake, and instead advocated for improving the deal. It also viewed the United States withdrawal from the nuclear deal, encouraged (or even pushed) by Israel, as a strategic error. In hindsight, the move only brought Iran closer to achieving military nuclear capabilities.
____________________________________________ 6 IICC Perspectives Questions to be asked The failures of the military intelligence system led the Agranat Commission2 to establish the Center at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create pluralism in intelligence thinking and assessment; for various reasons, over the years the weakening of the Center caused the erosion of the model. However, in 2006 the Winograd Commission3 praised the Center’s performance, despite its difficulties, for its reliable strategicpolitical assessments on the northern front in the face of the Hezbollah challenge, and recommended expanding and strengthening it. Foreign Minister Livni and Director General Abramovich, both energetic and committed, implemented the recommendations. Even years later, beyond their tenure, healthy attentiveness in the governing and intelligence systems to the Center’s analyses remained, including in the Cabinet. However, over time, the Center’s influence waned because of the weakening of the foreign ministry, budget cuts, depletion of human resources, and stripping the Center of key areas of responsibility and transferring them to other ministries. Several questions demand attention and there lessons still to be learned: • Why did an intelligence organization, denied access to some of the “intimate” intelligence materials,4 still have a clear view of the real situation, while parts of the intelligence community, favored with highly classified materials, failed to do so? Does reliance on classified materials and the expectation that they can provide warnings cause blindness and a failure to grasp the open strategic picture? • Why were all the intelligence assessments of all the agencies on the Palestinian issue not integrated so their validity could be evaluated, especially in a situation of dramatic regional changes? That could be expected, given the conclusions of the Agranat and Winograd Commission, which in practice evaporated. Under the law defining its roles, the National Security Council (NSC) was supposed to do just that but failed to fulfill its duty. According to the Winograd Commission recommendations, responsibility also lay with the foreign minister, who presumably also did not act. Integrating intelligence assessments among the various agencies is critical, also given the dominance of Military Intelligence (as the so-called “national assessor,” a title which should be discarded) and its weight within the intelligence system. 2 Investigated the IDF failure in the Yom Kippur War in 1973. 3 Investigated the Second Lebanon War in 2006. 4 For example, "Jericho Wall", the Hamas code name for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre.
____________________________________________ 7 IICC Perspectives • How did the notion that “Israel is a static player” in the regional political-military game take root in hierarchical systems? Why is there no recognition that the policies, actions and failures of the “blue side” often decisively influence the conduct of the adversary? Conclusions The failure of assessments prior to October 7 does not mean reinventing the wheel. Some propose stripping Military Intelligence of its monopoly as the “national assessor” and establishing a new integrating intelligence body (for example, modeled on the American DNI following 9/11). However, we believe such a coordinating mechanism would be unnecessary, since it would only add bureaucratic burdens and complexity. The mechanism already exists today as the National Security Council. Had it fulfilled its legal responsibility according to the 2008 NSC Law (specifically Section 2(a)(6), regarding preparation of situation assessments on political-security matters, “including opinions and analyses in the various intelligence domains”), the intelligence failure of Military Intelligence (including Southern Command Intelligence and the Gaza Division), and of the Shin Bet, might have been avoided. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the guidelines and procedures for effective policy-security staff work as set out by the Winograd Commission and subsequently the Lipkin-Shahak Commission5 for the NSC be studied and implemented. Their full and continuous implementation, including strengthening the Center and ensuring the transfer of classified intelligence materials for its use (without hiding behind information security excuses which serve to preserve organizational power), could serve as a cornerstone for reinforcing much-needed intelligence pluralism. The issue is especially critical in a situation in which a dominant leader entrenched in its own ability to understand reality and exclusively shape strategy is increasingly closed off to hearing and internalizing dissenting assessments.
____________________________________________ 8 IICC Perspectives And a few additional points: The growing importance of open-source intelligence (OSINT) in intelligence research necessitates the reconstruction of Hatzav6 in its original format, adapted to the age of the information explosion. The hasty abolition of Hatzav is a fundamental obstacle, as it stripped it and the entire intelligence community of the value of expertise and the comprehensive perspective it is supposed to provide, beyond channeling information snippets for operational needs. Beyond that, the expertise of Military Intelligence (and Shin Bet) researchers has to be reinforced in relation to the broader picture of the history of the conflict and the Middle East, for example, through study and knowledge testing before taking on roles, including senior ones. That would restore the recognition of the rightful importance of language, culture and history in classical intelligence work. The frequent adoption of fashionable new research methodologies may become an obstacle because of the temptation to abandon traditional demanding, painstaking research. Such methods, including the use of artificial intelligence in strategic research, should only serve as supporting tools and not as a substitute for the intelligence research profession. Old-new proposals such as upgrading the internal oversight department within Military Intelligence are insufficient, since the hierarchical organization in which it operates could once again neutralize its effectiveness. In conclusion, to the best of our understanding, over the years the Center has demonstrated its ability to present fresh, alternative thinking, well-reasoned and wellfounded. That may be the result of its unique composition, a combination of experienced researchers with significant expertise, long tenures in their specific fields, and knowledge of the language and culture of their research subjects, along with rotating tenures of diplomats who bring the Center practical experience from the diplomatic arena, gained through service abroad, including in Arab countries. The Center therefore constitutes a unique and successful model for researching and understanding strategic-political arena, though it too, naturally, is not immune to flaws and failures. 6 The unit in Israeli military intelligence which specializes in gathering OSINT. "Hatzav"'s logo. The growing importance of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), for research, necessitates the reconstruction "Hatzav" (source: Wikipedia).
____________________________________________ 9 IICC Perspectives It is therefore essential to strengthen the Center within the foreign ministry and the intelligence community. The mission is first and foremost the responsibility of the foreign minister, who has a vital, unique resource (almost unparalleled among foreign ministers worldwide) for managing Israel’s foreign policy and fulfilling responsibility in a critical domain. *Nimrod Barkan and Benny Dagan served for approximately 40 years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Barkan headed the Center from 2006 to 2010; Dagan from 2012 to 2017. Previously, both served as division heads and researchers at the Center, which functions as the Foreign Ministry’s intelligence branch. They also held senior positions within the ministry in Israel and served as ambassadors abroad.
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