IICC Perspectives - AMSHAT

____________________________________________ 7 IICC Perspectives Samaria, then Syria. We began receiving captured material from many completely different fronts." The first to arrive called their family members, friends, spouses, and children. People simply showed up here in extended families... D.: "We're a reserve unit in Military Intelligence, operating since the very beginning of the war. A multi-front, multi-language unit. We haven't taken a break for a moment. We've been working non-stop from day one of the war. All the other intelligence centers have rotated, shut down temporarily or been moved from front to front. Combat brigades that move from line to line stop for rest periods. Our unit hasn't rested for a minute. From zero people at the start of the war, in three months we had more than 500 active personnel, working in shifts 24/7. "How many people in Israel have put their entire lives on hold for 464 days? Set aside spouses, family, business, academic degrees, and more. They stopped everything and put it on hold! "Recently, looking ahead and understanding that it takes time to build and institutionalize a functioning unit like this, I conducted a survey, asking the unit's reservists how it would be most convenient for them to continue working here in the future: scheduled shifts, where I notify them in advance that I'll need them for two weeks in a given month, and they can coordinate it with home or work, or to keep operating the way we are now, with an ad-hoc work plan tailored to each individual? "The overwhelming majority, around 95%, told me: 'D., we're with you. We understand what we're doing here. We love the mission and the unit, and even if you cancel our emergency call-up orders, we'll keep coming. We're here.' I don't know of any other unit like this in the army, not just in Military Intelligence…" In a conference call with the Chief Intelligence Officer, he said to me in front of everyone: "Pack your things. Tomorrow, you're starting a unit." *** The next mission for the unit commander would be to convince the army that something called CED even existed. If until now he had to convince the besieged civilians living near the Gaza Strip that he was from Division 162, from the moment the unit was established he had to convince the IDF that there was such a thing as the CED Unit, and that all battlefield-captured material needed to be centralized with it. D.: "It wasn't just about calling the army and speaking authoritatively. It was about calling everyone who had encountered or handled documents and other materials, emergency and rescue forces, police, the Shin Bet, local emergency teams and standby squads. Calling and convincing them not only that there actually was such a

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