____________________________________________ 11 IICC Perspectives In the divisions, there was no awareness of CED, neither among the commanders nor the soldiers. Someone now had to explain what to do with all the intelligence that had landed in our hands, some of which was crucial for the beginning of the maneuver. It's important to understand just how lacking the units, and especially the combat soldiers, were in CED awareness. It wasn't obvious to them. They're in battle. Tough, brutal battle. Fully focused on the enemy, not on documents or material they're supposed to send back. When there's no CED awareness, no one collects material. The soldier on the front line is fully focused on one thing, putting the terrorist in his sights. And suddenly someone tells him, "If you're in the room, check what's in the closet. Look under the bed, in the drawers." Why would he do that if he has no CED awareness? But if you're a battalion commander responsible for hundreds of fighters, or a brigade commander with thousands under your command, and some nut job shows up and drops this material on your desk, your first instinct is to say thank you, realizing you just received live intelligence, some of which you weren't even aware of. That kind of commander will immediately revise his maneuvering plan. He'll know to steer clear of the pink polygon. And the added value, that same commander will also teach the soldier at the edge that this, too, has to be done, it's part of the mission, and it has immediate benefits. This Hamas Theodolite allowed important intelligence describing the underground tunnels system. (source: IICC)
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