____________________________________________ 8 IICC Perspectives emphasize the need for shared understandings and agreements among researchers and between them and policymakers, and operational personnel. It is often argued that it is also opposed to the hierarchical nature of organizations within the intelligence community. Therefore, it must be "imposed" on the analysts through mechanisms that make doubt and debate an integral part of the intelligence process, which is the responsibility of commanders and directors at all levels. Conclusion Exactly fifty years after the surprise of the Yom Kippur War, the surprise attack of October 7 2023 made it clear to the current generation of intelligence personnel and decision-makers that the knowledge at their disposal was, at best, a fragile system of hypotheses – one that must be continuously and rigorously tested. Even the highestquality information cannot resolve the uncertainty of reality, which should also guide efforts to understand the enemy and the environment. The array of both familiar and new issues identified in this article underscores the need for a fundamental shift in the intelligence analysis methodology, and especially in the culture within which it is applied. Therefore, the path to rehabilitating Aman involves parting with the concept of "intelligence superiority" and adopting a culture that not only acknowledges the possibility of a gap in understanding but also systematically works to identify "signals" that may indicate the existence and magnitude of the gap, including those related to the most deeply held beliefs. Such a culture is built on foundations of doubt and debate and embraces ambiguity as a natural element in a world where uncertainty reigns. This is likely the culture the Agranat Commission sought to instill by strengthening pluralism, but the lesson is that culture does not change solely through structural modifications. It is the direct responsibility of the leaders of intelligence organizations.
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