____________________________________________ 4 IICC Perspectives rules (or patterns) which intelligence can decipher, and once deciphered, intelligence can predict the future. This is what Harkabi meant when he wrote, "A good memory is the first condition for being a prophet," even though he himself was aware of the problem and elsewhere warned against depicting intelligence as a "prophecy institution." The main problem with this approach is that the dynamic reality of national security, with its multitude of actors and interests, has no fixed rules. Therefore, the basic assumption that future patterns of behavior can be predicted based on past actions is incorrect and misses the dynamism of human life. Leaders and other actors do not act according to rules or patterns that can be "deciphered." They make decisions in light of changing situations and often surprise observers by deviating from their previous patterns of behavior when their perceptions change. Intelligence personnel holding this view are aware that the enemy's behavior may change, but they believe that their familiarity with their subjects will allow them to identify a change when it occurs. However, experience teaches that we are often surprised even by the people closest to us, those to whom we have ample access and with whom there are no language or cultural barriers. It happens despite our familiarity with them and how they have behaved over the years. There is no doubt that the Israeli intelligence community had a deep, abiding problem in understanding how Hamas translated its vision into a concrete offensive plan, the military buildup to implement the plan and the decision to attack. Yet, some of those involved in the failure had a very thorough familiarity with Hamas, acquired over many years. This failure also extended to civilian experts who had studied Hamas. Even the few who questioned the concept of "a deterred Hamas committed to an arrangement" failed to imagine or warn about the surprise attack of October 7. The conclusion is that while familiarity with the enemy is immensely important, it cannot be the sole factor for understanding the enemy. It must be expressed within a skeptical and critical framework that recognizes the possibility of a potential gap in understanding. Even high-quality information will not lead to transparency The other trend stemmed from the belief that high-quality information was primary for understanding reality. In his book Neila (1991), Yoel Ben Porat describes information as "the raison d'être of intelligence." That approach assumes that the main reason for uncertainty is information gaps, and therefore the purpose of intelligence is to obtain information that can fill the gaps to resolve uncertainty. The trend strengthened after the Yom Kippur War, leading to the investment of substantial resources and undertaking high-risk operations to get as close as possible to the enemy’s decision-
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