____________________________________________ 8 IICC Perspectives stated that, contrary to false claims, at no stage and under no circumstances was Prime Minister Netanyahu given any warning of Hamas' intent to go to war and that, in the assessment of all security agencies, including the head of Military Intelligence and the head of the Shin Bet, Hamas was deterred and sought an arrangement. Such was the assessment repeatedly presented to the prime minister and the cabinet by all security agencies and the intelligence community, including up until the outbreak of the war. The ongoing campaign of repeated statements against the heads of the security and intelligence community (except for the Mossad) is unprecedented in Israeli society, which has always placed its trust in the security agencies, especially during wartime. The so-called “poison machine”—the Likud Party’s propaganda arms in the media— amplified messages that served the interests of the prime minister, and were mainly directed against the Chief of Staff and the head of the Shin Bet. They promoted conspiratorial claims that the intelligence system had deliberately concealed documents and information as part of a conspiracy leading up to the war. As reflected in polling results, the campaign eroded public trust in the security and intelligence community, which has begun to be suspected of political bias. Netanyahu could have addressed the public and refuted the claims but chose not to do so. All indications suggest that this climate undermined the traditional standards of integrity required from intelligence professionals in their dealings with the political leadership, especially the prime minister. The third and most dangerous phase for the independence of the intelligence community is the legislative initiative to establish a new intelligence department within the Prime Minister’s Office, intended to challenge the intelligence assessments of Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet, and the Mossad. The implications of such a move could be disastrous—injecting a clear political agenda into the assessment process and undermining the professional standing of the intelligence community, which has maintained its independence since its inception. The precedent of the Office of Special Plans established in the Pentagon in 2002—ostensibly to provide raw intelligence on Iraq but in reality, to pressure other intelligence agencies into producing assessments justifying the invasion of Iraq—illustrates the destructive impact such bodies can have on the ability to produce objective assessments. Finally, there is the concern that intelligence could be used to undermine the foundations of democracy. Nadav Argaman, former head of the Shin Bet, addressed the issue in general terms when he warned in an interview with Channel 12 about the potential damage to democratic norms. Avner Barnea, a former senior Shin Bet official, was more specific. Referring to Section 7(a) of the Shin Bet Law, which assigns the
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