____________________________________________ 7 IICC Perspectives Corporate culture A responsible investigation of war will of necessity shed light on many aspects of the overall picture. Some of them reflect the IDF's organizational culture and the investigation will provide a rare opportunity to consider them as part of a process to improve the IDF. Unfortunately, they may be seen as less important and less urgent to investigating the war and drawing conclusions, and therefore liable to be neglected. Here are a few aspects that should not be ignored. First, the matter of a commander's resignation: those calling for the resignation of commanders of units which failed in war did not understand the situation and had no responsibility for it. Immediate resignation has only symbolic value and not even that when the commander admits his failure and overall responsibility for a failure he did not prevent. His resignation has value only if it comes after an investigation and a process leading to an improvement in the unit's activities. Merely replacing one commander with another does not guarantee improvement. There has to be a solid foundation for every step in the process which also includes resignation and replacement. Second, the rules of operation: to the extent the IDF's values and norms guide the fighter's conduct, they were supposed to be part of the IDF's code of ethics, "The spirit of the IDF: principles and basic principles." The 1994 code had 34 practical principles which were disgracefully deleted in 2001, ordered by Chief of Staff Mofaz to be restored, but to this day the order has not been carried out. If the IDF had principles properly explained, understood and assimilated, many historical IDF mishaps could have been avoided. Unfortunately, an attempt made several years ago to adopt a system of principles (rules of conduct) based on the activity of 25 commanders' teams, was not confirmed by the General Staff. Third, organizational memory: anyone who follows complex, vital military activities, not with a passing glance but over a long period of time, sees the weakness of the IDF's organizational memory. More than once I found myself invited to help an activity that had already been completed long ago, but whose successful results had faded with the frequent changes of commanders. It is possible to reinvent the military wheel countless times, but it should have to happen. Corporate culture (Source: hrus.co.il website) (Source: istockphoto.com website)
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