____________________________________________ 3 IICC Perspectives the West Bank will pave Hamas' way directly to the West Bank, at least in terms of public support. A political arrangement, on the other hand, will cause the reformed Palestinian Authority, with regional and international support, to establish a government for both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, a reorganized Palestinian Authority will not dare to return to the Gaza Strip while the conflict and occupation continue, and the same is true for Arab, Islamic and international aid. Every suggestion for creating a hybrid of managing the conflict with Palestinian, Arab, Islamic and international support (which was also offered by the Eisenkot Plan of March 29, 2024) is doomed to failure. Those invited to help will not volunteer to help the Israeli occupation while the conflict continues and escalates. In effect, what Netanyahu is offering is a "peaceful occupation," like the format for Territory B in the Oslo Accords. It is no wonder that no one will be found willing to discuss participating in an unreasonable and unrealistic oxymoron of the "peacefully occupied." Looking for local allies, such as the heads of the clans in the Gaza Strip, is also doomed to failure. Anyone who did not learn from the collapse of the attempt to form a "village associations" as a substitute for PLO supporters in the West Bank in the mid-1970s will quickly be bitterly disillusioned. The local ruling "bubbles," as they are called, will burst. If before October 7 Israel wanted to prevent a political settlement by separating the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, now Israel, under Netanyahu's stewardship, wants to join the two by in effect equating the status of the Gaza Strip as "occupied," similar to the West Bank, by keeping the local civilian ruling entities separate, thereby changing the management of the conflict after October 7. As before the 7th of October, that kind of management completely ignores the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state. The consequences of the return of the Repressed The consequences of the continuation of managing the conflict, even in a different disguise, will be existential. In effect, the State of Israel will become responsible for 2.3 million Gazans living in a region hammered by catastrophe, to say nothing of the fact that the Gazans population doubles every 20-25 years. That will immediately turn Jewish Israelis into the minority in their own state: a large minority, but a minority nevertheless. Including Israeli Arabs, there will be, at this point, 7.3 million Arabs to 7.2 Jews. This will entail extremely As Hamas today rests on the generation cauterized and tempered by the second intifada, when it comes of age, the current generation, burned and tempered in the Gaza Strip War, will shoulder the next campaign. Photo: Avi Ohayon, Israeli Government Press Office
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