____________________________________________ 7 IICC Perspectives Assessing the nature of the enemy's plan of attack: In 1973, the Egyptians and Syrians planned a war whose military objectives were limited. In Israel, however, it was assumed that Egypt and Syria were considering either a renewal of the War of Attrition, or a full-scale war, but did not envision the possibility of a limited military move. Since it was assessed, that they would be deterred from a full-scale, existential war, the likelihood of threat, as a whole, greatly decreased. In 2023, the intelligence error was rooted in an underestimation of Hamas: no one considered Hamas could or would launch a large-scale attack, but only a limited maneuver, simultaneous raids on a few agricultural villages (Kibutzim or Moshavim), involving 15-20 terrorists in each attack, and here too, the assessment failed. Timing: In the summer of 1973, Egypt chose Yom Kippur as the date for the attack. Behind the scenes, President Sadat's despaired at the failure of political measures to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Several possible dates were offered, such as the spring of 1973 (the "Blue-White Alert" of May), and finally the later date was chosen, October 6, 1973. The choice of Yom Kippur itself actually made it easier for the IDF to mobilize reserves and allowed the Syrians to be contained as early as noon on October 7, 1973; and the halt of the Egyptian advance in some sectors (against the limited target which was set). President Hafez al-Assad, (Source: Wikipedia) Israeli prisoners in Egypt and a destroyed Israeli tank in Sinai (Source: IDF Archive)
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