____________________________________________ 6 IICC Perspectives The failures of 1973 and 2023: selected aspects of similarity and difference. the attacker's rationale: In 1973, President Sadat wanted to shock Israel's decisionmakers and lead them to political negotiations. From the moment the war decided on October 24, 1972, he planned a limited Egyptian military move, so as not to overwhelm Israel. As far as he was concerned, a limited military attack would be sufficient to bring the political achievement he wanted. In 2023 as well, the Hamas attack was not intended to pose an immediate existential threat to the State of Israel, but to create shock waves and cracks for the long term, a significant step on the way to Israel's future collapse, so Hamas thought. The reference to the Israeli deterrence: When the intention is not achieving military decision, Israel's deterrence means very little: in 1973 the Egyptians were deterred from a full-scale war which would be an existential threat to Israel, but not from a limited war. The same was true in 2023: Hamas recognized its advantage in the relationship of forces vis-à-vis the IDF in the area immediately adjacent to the Gaza Strip and its ability to score a significant achievement. Even if it misjudged Israel's counterreaction, Hamas was not deterred. President Anwar Sadat (Source: Wikipedia) Yahya Sinwar, Hamas leader in Gaza (Source: A.P.)
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