____________________________________________ 11 IICC Perspectives It is worth emphasizing: The three aforementioned collection systems, put technology above everything else, and there is considerable concern that it was done while some of the basic elements of intelligence work in the areas of collection and analysis, were neglected. The HUMINT failure: In 1973, there was an abundance of accurate HUMINT information and alerts from Mossad sources. From what is known so far, on the eve of the 2023 attack and massacre, there was no such warning or information from sources within the Shin Bet, the only agency that used human resources regarding Gaza strip. The OSINT failure: Much visible information about Hamas' attack methods was published in the open media, but apparently, as on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, it was considered to be of little, if any, value, certainly not as a warning. Whether the consequences of the decentralization of "Hatsav" open source unit contributed to the overall failure, should be examined. In addition, there are prominent several cultural-methodological failures (again, within the limitations of what has been depicted so far): OSINT - Open-Source Intelligence (Source: CSARN Global Cyber Academy) Humint: a prisoner is interviewed by an interrogator (Source: Malam archive)
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