____________________________________________ 10 IICC Perspectives The SIGINT failure: In 1973 as well, SIGINT did not produce the explicit warnings the analysts wished for, and until two days before the outbreak of the war, it still did not consider providing a warning. In 2023, from what has been published so far, no SIGINT information was produced from tactical sources, and no sufficiently specific SIGINT information was received about the expected timing of the attack. The SIGINT information that was produced in the two years before the attack, although correctly interpreted by some of the working ranks in Unit 8200, did not, as far as we know, receive the status it deserved because of its quality, as a result of assessment errors and indulgent interpretation. The VISINT failure: A sortie was made only two days before the outbreak of the 1973 war, after two weeks without photographs. Quality information obtained from the surveillance in the field during the two months preceding the war, failed to break through the wall of prior conceptions. In 2023, when the Gaza Strip was literally right under Israel's nose, and VISINT was immeasurably more convenient than in any other arena, it did not yield the full picture of the tunnels and the other Hamas infrastructures, and did not contribute to the immediate warning. Signals Intelligence (Source: Malam archive) VISINT, Visual Intelligence. Operating satellites decoder at unit 9900 (Source: IDF spokesman)
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