____________________________________________ 6 IICC Perspectives Eliyahu Eilat, who arrived in Washington in 1946, learned about the pressures on President Truman by pro-Arab elements in the administration, mainly in the State Department and oil companies. Truman, who had previously shown sympathy for Zionism and the issue of displaced Jews, was slow to make Palestine-related decisions. The activation of Jewish (not just Zionist) organizations, vis-à-vis the administration and Congress, led Truman in October 1946 to demand the U.K. increase the immigration quotas. This appeal sparked protests in the Arab world, and King Saud published a strongly worded letter to President Truman, calling on the United States to oppose "Zionist aggression" on the grounds that the Jews aspire to spread across Arab countries, including towards the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. President Truman replied (over the head of the State Department) that since World War I, the United States has supported the idea of self-determination of nations, and, therefore, supports the establishment of a national home in Palestine to absorb the displaced persons. The secret intelligence gathered in Washington included political assessments of the situation in Palestine and the positions of the various countries regarding the chances of realizing partition. The information was derived from diplomatic correspondence between Washington and Arab capitals, and internal information from the discussions of the U.S. delegation to the UN and with Arab counterparts, as well as from listening to Arab diplomats. Jordan – Continuous links with Emir Abdullah The Political Department attributed great importance to the continuation of contacts with Emir Abdullah, which had begun in a well-publicized meeting between Weizmann and the Emir as early as 1922. In 1934, the Agency reached an agreement with the Emir regarding negotiations with Britain. The contacts took place throughout the period and even included financial support to the Emir. In 1946-1947, the agency worked to persuade Abdullah to accept the partition decision and then to refrain from taking military action against the Yishuv. In two meetings Sasson held with Abdullah in August 1946, he reached a vague understanding that the Emir would agree to accept the partition plan, in return for his annexation of the Arab districts west of the Jordan River; additional sums of money were to be involved. In a crucial meeting in November 1947, Golda Meyerson met, at Ben-Gurion's request and accompanied by Sasson and Shiloah, with King Abdullah, who expressed a sort of agreement to partition, but one that would "not embarrass him in the eyes of the Arab world." Thus, the delegation thought Abdulla would not participate in an all-out Arab offensive. On May 12, Golda met again with the Emir, accompanied by Ezra Danin, but at this meeting, it was already clear that Jordan would participate in the war. At the same time, throughout the entire period, extensive intelligence contacts were maintained with Jordan. Operatives met with personalities in the royal court, and Jordanian statesmen, who provided continuing information about the developments in the Arab world, especially in Syria and Saudi Arabia, including the attempts to establish a Hashemite kingdom in Greater Syria.
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